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ABSTRACT 
  To protect U.S. user data from foreign threats, presidents have 
wielded their emergency power to ban transactions with certain 
technology companies. This emergency power, if unchecked, threatens 
both the procedural rights of some technology companies and U.S. 
constitutional structure. 
  Concerning procedural rights, this Note evaluates existing 
procedural due process jurisprudence to identify the scope of these 
protections in the data security context, which remains unexplored in 
scholarship and judicial opinions. For guidance, this Note looks to 
cases involving counterterrorist financing and national security reviews 
of foreign investment, and it concludes that procedural due process 
protects many technology companies that collect personally 
identifiable information. In particular, due process requires the 
government to provide these companies with meaningful notice and an 
opportunity to respond before the president wields emergency powers 
that slash these companies’ economic interests. These predeprivation 
procedural rights significantly safeguard affected companies by giving 
them time to respond. 
  However, due process alone will not prevent the emergency 
executive from running roughshod over the Constitution’s system of 
checks and balances. This Note argues, as have many commentators, 
that Congress should recalibrate the balance: Congress should amend 
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IEEPA to include a sunset provision that would limit the duration of 
any national emergency until Congress affirmatively votes to extend it 
through a fast-track process. Ultimately, procedural due process and 
political process must work hand in hand to protect both constitutional 
rights and structures. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology connects us, but data divide us. Millions of individuals 
across the United States express themselves in cyberspace, leaving 
their data behind like fingerprints. Their digital dealings offer troves of 
information to not only researchers and retailers but also foreign and 
domestic intelligence officers and cyberterrorists. The specter of 
espionage has galvanized the federal government to act. To protect 
U.S. user data from foreign threats, the government has deployed 
various regulatory tools, including the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).1 When presidents declare national 
emergencies related to “unusual and extraordinary” threats,2 IEEPA 
empowers them to terminate transactions, freeze assets, and otherwise 
wage economic warfare to combat those threats.3 However, this 
emergency power, if unchecked, threatens the procedural rights of 
some technology companies and could overturn the delicate separation 
of powers upon which the federal government teeters. 
To meet the threats of a digitally connected world, measures under 
IEEPA have taken several forms. IEEPA has historically been used to 
freeze assets of terrorists and criminals.4 As economic and social 
 
 1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706. Numerous 
executive orders have invoked IEEPA to protect U.S. technology infrastructure. See, e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 13,694, 3 C.F.R. 297 (2016) (titled “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging 
in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities” (emphasis omitted)); Exec. Order No. 13,873, 
3 C.F.R. 317, 317 (2020) (banning transactions in order to safeguard “vulnerabilities in 
information and communications technology and services”); Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 
48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020) (blocking transactions with TikTok in order to secure U.S. user 
data). Beyond IEEPA, Congress in 2018 extended the scope of foreign investment review to 
transactions that may compromise sensitive U.S. user data. See infra notes 149–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b). 
 3. See id. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the president to “investigate, block during the 
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” any 
transaction involving foreign interests or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction). See infra Part I 
for a more detailed discussion of IEEPA. 
 4. See generally CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E. RENNACK & 
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY 
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interactions have shifted online, the United States has adapted to 
monitor the flow of sensitive user data to the nation’s adversaries.5 For 
instance, U.S. policymakers worry the Chinese government exploits 
China’s commercial relationships to spy on individuals across the 
United States.6 To protect U.S. individuals from such data security 
threats, the president may pivot from traditional asset freezes to 
targeted transaction prohibitions.7 These transaction bans under 
IEEPA resemble divestment orders that sometimes follow national 
security reviews of foreign investment undertaken by the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), which 
operates under a different legal framework.8 Rather than locking up 
assets in the United States, both bans deliberately expel enterprises 
from the U.S. economy. 
But using IEEPA to restrict technology companies’ economic 
presence in the United States may backfire. As a policy matter, asset 
freezes and transaction bans could constrict foreign investment.9 As a 
constitutional matter, broad concessions of emergency power threaten 
 
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE (2020) (discussing trends in IEEPA 
applications). 
 5. See Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an Open 
Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 9 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 1, 4 (2018) (discussing the unprecedented volume of interaction between the United States 
and China); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 3–4 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_
Emerging_Technology_and_National_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GV3-HBAE] (discussing 
the influence of emerging technologies on national security). 
 6. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 5, at 26. According to one report, Chinese firms target and 
invest in “early-stage start-up firms that . . . have high growth potential, in order to transfer 
leading-edge technologies from new U.S. start-up firms to China.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(CFIUS) 36 (2018). 
 7. See David R. Allman, Scalpel or Sledgehammer? Blocking Predatory Foreign Investment 
with CFIUS or IEEPA, 10 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 267, 331–33 (2020) (distinguishing 
between asset-freezing and transaction-banning sanctions under IEEPA). 
 8. See infra Part II.B. For an overview of the framework governing national security review 
of foreign investment, see generally JACKSON, supra note 6.  
 9. See R. Colgate Selden, The Executive Protection: Freezing the Financial Assets of Alleged 
Terrorists, the Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U.S. Financial Markets, 8 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 511 (2003) (“The efficient free flow of investment within U.S. markets will 
be difficult to maintain if the government’s latitude to freeze assets is not balanced by increased 
consideration of the constitutionality of such actions.”). In 2017, about $7.8 trillion worth of 
foreign direct investment flowed into the United States. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 3. 
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the institutional balance of power and individual rights.10 Courts have 
proven reluctant to question the allocation of emergency powers 
between Congress and the president.11 Targeted technology companies 
may instead seek refuge in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.12 
The Fifth Amendment mandates, “No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”13 
When the president freezes assets or prohibits transactions with a 
company, the president deprives that entity of its property rights by 
effectively shuttering its business.14 In such situations, the Due Process 
Clause requires the government to provide the company with notice 
and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”15 The dictates of due process depend on the 
nature of the threat and the executive’s response.16 Presidents have 
deployed IEEPA differently to respond to a broad array of threats, 
 
 10. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. 
L. REV. 699, 705 (2006) (arguing emergency powers undermine the rule of law). See generally 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing 
institutional dynamics that have aggrandized the presidency); OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ 
AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006) 
(describing various models of emergency regimes in democratic societies). 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 14. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 316 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(holding the company’s “state-law property rights fully vested upon the completion of the 
transaction, meaning due process protections necessarily attached”); Al Haramain Islamic Found. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2012) (“By design, a [terrorist 
designation] completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. All assets are frozen. No 
person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity . . . .”); KindHearts 
for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 904 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(describing an asset freeze that indefinitely shut down an organization and jeopardized its 
corporate existence). However, the Supreme Court held contingent interests do not sustain Fifth 
Amendment claims. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672–74 (1981) (concluding the 
attachment of Iranian property did not support a Fifth Amendment takings claim because 
regulations explicitly stated such attachments were void unless licensed and such licenses could 
be revoked). The court in Ralls distinguished contingent attachments from fully vested state 
property rights and explained the federal government cannot evade the Due Process Clause by 
simply announcing the possibility of future property deprivations. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 316. To hold 
otherwise would neuter due process rights. 
 15. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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from entities funding terrorist activities to Chinese-owned technology 
companies, thereby triggering distinct due process obligations. 
TikTok provides a recent example. TikTok is a social media 
platform, on which users create and share short videos augmented with 
editing tools.17 TikTok deploys a proprietary algorithm to cater content 
to individual user preferences, making the app wildly popular and 
addicting.18 In June 2020, the app served 91,937,040 monthly active 
users in the United States.19 TikTok is incorporated and headquartered 
in the United States, but it is owned by ByteDance Ltd., a Chinese 
company.20 In an August 6, 2020, executive order, President Donald 
Trump prospectively banned TikTok from the United States.21 Relying 
on IEEPA and citing data security concerns, the executive order 
prohibited “any transaction by any person, or with respect to any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” with 
ByteDance or any of its subsidiaries.22 After a few weeks, TikTok sued 
the U.S. government, arguing the ban was unlawful and 
unconstitutional.23 Among its many claims, TikTok asserted the 
government violated its procedural due process rights.24 Particularly, 
the company complained that the transaction ban de facto shut down 
its application, depriving TikTok of its property.25 Before the August 6 
order, TikTok alleged, the government provided neither notice nor an 
opportunity to respond.26 The Biden administration paused the 
litigation in February 2021 when it filed unopposed motions to hold 
ongoing appeals in abeyance as the administration pondered the future 
 
 17. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 7, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 
3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (No. 20-cv-2658), 2020 WL 5628983 [hereinafter TikTok 
Complaint]; Our Mission, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/about? [https://perma.cc/NV2R-
RH5F]. 
 18. Louise Matsakis, TikTok Finally Explains How the ‘For You’ Algorithm Works, WIRED 
(June 18, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-finally-explains-for-you-algorithm-
works [https://perma.cc/XA9B-VTG2]. 
 19. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 8. 
 20. Id. at 6; Nicolas Chu, What You Should Know About ByteDance, the Company Behind 
TikTok, LINKEDIN (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-you-should-know-
bytedance-company-behind-tiktok-nicolas-chu [https://perma.cc/L9X2-6BB5]. 
 21. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020). 
 22. Id. 
 23. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Id. at 36. 
 26. Id. 
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of the prior president’s restrictions.27 In June 2021, President Joe Biden 
revoked President Trump’s order and replaced it with a broader 
framework for reviewing foreign-owned applications for national 
security concerns.28 This evolving controversy illustrates longstanding 
questions about the relationship between emergency powers and 
procedural rights in a new context—the digital economy. 
This Note wades into these unexplored digital depths by applying 
existing due process jurisprudence—as developed in the contexts of 
counterterrorist financing and national security reviews of foreign 
investment—to the relatively untouched data security domain. This 
Note argues that procedural due process29 protects many technology 
companies that collect personally identifiable information. In 
particular, due process requires the government to provide these 
companies with meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond 
before the president wields emergency powers that eliminate these 
companies’ economic interests.30 This notice must include at least the 
government’s unclassified reasons for acting.31 These predeprivation 
procedural rights significantly safeguard affected companies by giving 
them time to respond, but due process will not prevent the emergency 
executive from running roughshod over the Constitution’s system of 
checks and balances.32 To recalibrate this balance, Congress should 
amend IEEPA to include a sunset provision that would limit the 
duration of any national emergency until Congress affirmatively votes 
to extend it through a fast-track process.33  
Part I introduces IEEPA, its implementation, and its record in the 
courts. Turning to due process, Part II assesses what and when process 
is due in the new context of data security, guided by the existing case 
 
 27. Joint Status Report at 1–2, TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-cv-2658 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2021). 
 28. Paul Ziobro, Biden Seeks Review of Foreign-Owned Apps Beyond TikTok, WeChat. 
Here’s What You Need to Know., WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2021, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/biden-seeks-review-of-foreign-owned-apps-beyond-tiktok-wechat-heres-what-you-need-
to-know-11623356392 [https://perma.cc/C2ZZ-6ZYT]. Instead of singling out TikTok, President 
Biden’s executive order tasked executive officials with assessing threats arising from selling, 
transferring, or accessing U.S. individuals’ “sensitive data” or from accessing “large data 
repositories by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, a 
foreign adversary.” Exec. Order No. 14,034, 86 Fed. Reg. 31,423, 31,424 (June 9, 2021). 
 29. To clarify, this Note focuses on procedural due process rather than substantive due 
process. Throughout this Note, “due process” refers to procedural due process. 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. See infra Part II.C. 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
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law in the counterterrorist financing and foreign investment settings. 
Part III acknowledges both threshold and remedial limitations of these 
procedural rights, but it concludes that these rights meaningfully 
protect technology companies that hold U.S. individuals’ data. 
Recognizing that procedural rights will not sufficiently maintain 
constitutional structure, Part IV endorses an existing legislative 
proposal that would curb executive emergency power by adding a 
sunset provision to IEEPA.  
Political checks must meet procedural safeguards to circumscribe 
the president’s emergency economic powers and protect individuals 
and enterprises from potential executive overreach. To be clear, this 
Note does not purport to judge the tactical or strategic wisdom of 
targeting one entity or another. Instead, it argues that when the 
executive branch acts to isolate certain companies from the U.S. 
economy, it must honor these enterprises’ procedural rights. 
I.  FRAMEWORK OF IEEPA  
IEEPA delegates power to the president to control economic 
transactions during emergencies. To invoke IEEPA, the president 
must find the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat, which 
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to 
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States.”34 Next, the president must formally declare a national 
emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act 
(“NEA”).35 Once invoked, IEEPA authorizes the president to “nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit” any transaction involving foreign interests or 
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction.36 Though Congress intended 
 
 34. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). 
 35. Id. § 1701(b); see H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977) (describing presidential authority 
conferred by IEEPA as “subject to various procedural limitations, including those of the National 
Emergencies Act”). 
 36. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”). USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded IEEPA. First, it permits 
the president to act “during the pendency of an investigation.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Second, 
it authorizes courts to review classified information ex parte and in camera, thereby allowing the 
government to present classified evidence to the court without disclosure to the targeted party or 
its attorney. Id. § 1702(c); Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process 
That Is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1390 (2005). Thus, the 
USA PATRIOT Act amendments authorize the executive to freeze an entity’s assets before 
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IEEPA to rein in presidential emergency powers, the statute’s limits 
have withered. Over time, national emergencies have increased in 
scope, frequency, and duration.37 Meanwhile, the courts have deferred 
to the president.38 This Part tracks the development of IEEPA: its 
enactment by Congress, its subsequent execution, and its 
interpretation by the federal judiciary. 
A. Enacting IEEPA 
Congress enacted IEEPA in the second half of the twentieth 
century to curb presidential emergency powers, but its limits have 
decayed. IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy 
Act (“TWEA”),39 was enacted during World War I and enabled the 
president to regulate U.S. transactions with foreign nations during 
congressionally declared wars.40 As the country battled the Great 
Depression, Congress expanded TWEA to reach domestic transactions 
and applied it to national emergencies in peacetime.41 Presidents flexed 
their newfound power, blurring the purported line between economics 
and national security.42 One congressman remarked TWEA all but 
conferred “dictatorial powers that [the president] could have used 
 
concluding the target transgressed and permit the government to rely on “secret evidence” never 
disclosed to the party against which it is used. Nice-Petersen, supra. 
 37. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–23; see David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: 
Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2588 (2003) 
(“[E]mergency powers have a way of surviving long after the emergency has passed, and 
emergencies themselves may last decades.”). 
 38. See infra Part I.C. 
 39. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4341). 
 40. Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 
95th Cong. 8 (1977) [hereinafter TWEA Markup] (statement of Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y and Trade). 
 41. Id. (discussing the expansion of TWEA and describing it as a “grab-bag of authorities 
which Presidents have been able to use to do virtually anything for which they could find no 
specific authority”). 
 42. For example, President Franklin Roosevelt utilized TWEA to institute a banking 
holiday. Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric 
of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT’L LAW. 715, 743 (1992). Under TWEA, President 
Harry Truman seized property to fuel the Korean war effort. See id. (describing Truman’s seizing 
of property and commodities during the Korean war). President Richard Nixon wielded TWEA 
to regulate U.S. monetary reserves and to maintain trade balances, finding that “our trade and 
international competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to 
assure our security could be impaired.” Id. (quoting Proclamation No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971)). 
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without any restraint by the Congress.”43 Eventually, the Vietnam War 
and Watergate galvanized Congress to act.44 First, in 1976, Congress 
enacted NEA,45 which prescribed new limits and procedures for 
declaring national emergencies.46 Next, Congress limited TWEA to 
apply only in wartime.47 Finally, Congress passed IEEPA in 1977 to 
govern peacetime emergency powers.48 IEEPA primarily imposed two 
limits. Both have weakened. 
First, IEEPA, as initially enacted, empowered Congress to 
terminate any declared national emergency—the precondition of 
IEEPA action—by passing a concurrent resolution.49 This provision 
lost its bite, however, when the Supreme Court invalidated such 
legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha.50 Consequently, Congress may only 
terminate a national emergency by joint, not concurrent, resolution.51 
 
 43. TWEA Markup, supra note 40, at 5 (statement of Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham). 
 44. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 6; Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 743 (“In the wake of 
Watergate and Vietnam Congress moved in the mid-1970s to control executive abuse of the 
TWEA.”). 
 45. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651). 
 46. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (describing key NEA provisions). 
 47. See Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. I, 91 Stat. 
1625, 1625 (1977) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act is amended by striking 
out ‘or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President’ in the text 
preceding subparagraph (A).”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977). 
 48. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1625, 
1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706); CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.  
 49. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 46. 
 50. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59, 958 n.23 (1983) (invalidating legislative 
provisions that do not follow the Article I process, including presentment to the president). 
Legislative vetoes are congressional oversight mechanisms—such as one-house or two-house 
vetoes—that enable Congress to respond to executive actions without running the gauntlet of the 
full legislative process, which requires Congress to submit the potential legislation to the president 
for their signature or veto. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES 
AFTER CHADHA 1 (2005). In Chadha, the Court held Congress must follow the legislative process, 
subject to both bicameralism and presentment requirements, when Congress acts with “the 
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, 
including . . . Executive Branch officials.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. Both joint and concurrent 
resolutions require approval from both houses, satisfying the bicameralism requirement. Types of 
Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6JGC-X58P]. Unlike concurrent resolutions, however, joint resolutions require 
the president’s signature to become law. Id. Therefore, joint resolutions are not unconstitutional 
legislative vetoes. 
 51. BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE 
HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 204–05 (1988); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1080 (2004). 
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Because the president can veto joint resolutions, Congress now must 
cobble together a two-thirds majority in both houses to terminate a 
national emergency in the face of presidential resistance.52 In divisive 
times, this task is herculean at best and impossible in practice. 
Second, together with NEA, IEEPA contemplates consulting and 
reporting requirements. IEEPA requires the president to consult with 
Congress before acting under IEEPA “in every possible instance.”53 
After acting, the president must periodically report to Congress.54 
However, “the statute’s weak consultation and reporting procedures 
have been largely diluted or ignored.”55 Meanwhile, NEA requires 
Congress to meet every six months to consider whether to terminate 
any existing emergencies.56 NEA further requires the president to 
renew any declared national emergencies each year to prevent them 
from lapsing.57 But the statute does not limit renewals. Presidents have 
nominally complied with procedural and reporting requirements by 
submitting pro forma reports every six months, but Congress has never 
attempted to terminate a national emergency declared pursuant to 
NEA to authorize action under IEEPA.58 When push comes to shove, 
Congress cannot muster the political will to check the president.59 As 
meaningful checks on emergency executive power have disintegrated,60 
the president has obtained through IEEPA free rein to prohibit 
transactions and freeze assets. 
 
 52. CARTER, supra note 51, at 205; Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1080. 
 53. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a). 
 54. Id. § 1703(b)–(c). 
 55. Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1079; see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic 
Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1234–35 (1987) 
(“In practice, however, [consulting and reporting requirements] create few roadblocks to 
presidential action.”). 
 56. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b). 
 57. Id. § 1622(d). 
 58. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 44; see also Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 745 (“Although 
the executive has perfunctorily reported on the status of emergencies, Congress has neither 
reviewed nor considered terminating them.”). 
 59. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 744 (“Presidents have regularly sidestepped 
congressional restrictions, gaining access to IEEPA’s broad grants of authority with almost no 
congressional opposition.”); see also supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 746–47; Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President 
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 
1258 (1988) (discussing “executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance” 
in foreign affairs). 
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B. Executing IEEPA 
As threats proliferate, the president’s emergency powers 
propagate. IEEPA’s drafters hoped to circumscribe these powers, 
saving them for “rare and brief” emergencies.61 Over IEEPA’s 
lifespan, however, presidentially declared national emergencies have 
increased in scope, frequency, and duration.62 As of July 2020, 
presidents had declared sixty-seven emergencies under NEA.63 Fifty-
nine of them invoked IEEPA, and thirty-three of these remained in 
effect as of that date.64 On average, emergencies have retained their 
“declared” status for about a decade.65 Some emergencies have 
remained “declared” considerably longer. For instance, the first 
national emergency invoking IEEPA, declared by President Jimmy 
Carter during the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, remains in effect as of 
this writing.66  
Ever since, the United States has come to rely heavily on 
economic emergency powers and IEEPA in order to further various 
policy objectives from combatting nuclear proliferation to countering 
terrorism, cybercrime to election interference.67 Initially, many 
executive orders under IEEPA were limited to a particular country or 
government, but presidents have pivoted from targeting state actors to 
 
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10–11 (1977) (“[E]mergencies are by their nature rare and 
brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems. . . . A state of national emergency 
should not be a normal state of affairs.”). 
 62. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–23 (discussing broadening emergency 
declarations); Cole, supra note 37, at 2588 (“[E]mergency powers have a way of surviving long 
after the emergency has passed, and emergencies themselves may last decades.”); see also 
Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1030 (“Unless careful precautions are taken, emergency measures 
have a habit of continuing well beyond their time of necessity. Governments should not be 
permitted to run wild even during the emergency . . . .”). 
 63. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–18. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 17. 
 66. Id. at 18–19. 
 67. See Kathy Gilsinan, A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions, ATLANTIC (May 3, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625 
[https://perma.cc/3ZU3-RXW9] (describing increasing sanctions use by the United States). See 
generally JUAN ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL 
WARFARE (2013) (discussing the United States’ development and use of economic strategies to 
combat its adversaries). The current U.S. sanctions regime primarily rests on IEEPA. Elena 
Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063, 1094 (2020); Jonathan Masters, 
What Are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc/3YQD-JQ96] (last updated Aug. 
12, 2019). 
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declaring broader emergencies stemming from transnational threats.68 
In recent years, President Barack Obama declared an emergency in 
view of “[p]ersons [e]ngaging in [s]ignificant [m]alicious [c]yber-
[e]nabled [a]ctivities.”69 He then blocked their “property” subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction by prohibiting it from being “transferred, paid, 
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.”70 President Trump 
declared an emergency arising from “foreign adversaries . . . creating 
and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications 
technology and services.”71 He then prohibited the “acquisition, 
importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use” of certain 
information and communications technology or services flagged by the 
Secretary of Commerce.72 As presidents continue to wield IEEPA, 
wide-ranging emergencies have come to pervade U.S. politics 
“unchecked, unreviewed, and perfunctorily reported.”73 This 
expansion of executive power has met little resistance from federal 
courts.  
C. Interpreting IEEPA 
The judiciary has deferred to the president and expansively 
interpreted IEEPA.74 Courts often yield to the executive branch on 
 
 68. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1094–95; see also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: 
Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13–14 (2005) 
(noting President Bill Clinton “broke new ground under IEEPA by ordering sanctions targeting 
not a state and its citizens but, instead, terrorist organizations and their members”). As Professor 
James Savage explains, IEEPA was originally “used against nations and national corporations,” 
but “[n]ow our national interests have necessitated that the IEEPA evolve further, so that it can 
be used to block transactions, freeze and seize assets of terrorists who are basically stateless and 
can move with relative freedom around the globe.” James J. Savage, Executive Use of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act – Evolution Through the Terrorist and Taliban 
Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS 28, 37 (2001). 
 69. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 3 C.F.R. 297 (2016) (emphasis omitted).  
 70. Id.  
 71. Exec. Order No. 13,873, 3 C.F.R. 317, 317 (2020).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1416 
(1989). 
 74. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“[O]ur review—in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and 
administrative law—is extremely deferential.”); Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 
2012) (“Courts are particularly mindful that their review is highly deferential when matters of 
foreign policy and national security are concerned.” (citing Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d 
at 734)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 84 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(“Blocking orders are an important component of U.S. foreign policy, and the President’s choice 
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matters of foreign affairs and national security, which require the 
executive’s expertise, secrecy, and political accountability.75 Executive 
emergency power has been a creature of statute since Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.76 Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his iconic 
concurrence,77 distinguished among three categories of presidential 
power. In the first category, the president acts with express or implied 
congressional authorization; when backed by a statute, presidential 
action is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation.”78 In contrast, when the president 
acts contrary to the will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”79 
In between lies Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight,” where Congress 
has neither authorized nor prohibited presidential action.80 Judicial 
deference fluctuates based on the interplay of the political branches, so 
broad statutes make for broad executive power. 
As the Court made clear in Dames & Moore v. Regan,81 IEEPA is 
a broad statute. In Regan, President Carter, relying on IEEPA, 
nullified judicial attachments and suspended private claims against 
Iran as part of an accord to end the Iranian hostage crisis.82 The Court 
held IEEPA implicitly authorized the president’s measures, noting that 
“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible 
 
of this tool to combat terrorism is entitled to particular deference.”), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The 
nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and 
their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 24-406, at 24 
(1836))); see also Chachko, supra note 67, at 1136 (summarizing the “conventional wisdom” that 
courts lack the institutional capacity to decide matters of national security). 
 76. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction 
or conjunction with those of Congress.”). 
 77. Jackson’s concurrence has, over time, eclipsed the majority’s opinion. See, e.g., Louis 
Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94 (2d ed. 1996) (labeling 
Jackson’s opinion “a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent powers”); Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1201, 1257 (2018) (characterizing Jackson’s framework as “canonical”); Daryl J. Levinson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) 
(describing Jackson’s concurrence as “the most celebrated judicial opinion of the separation-of-
powers canon”). 
 78. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 79. Id. at 637. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 82. Id. at 660. 
ELLISON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2021  10:05 AM 
512  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:499 
action the President may find [necessary].”83 According to the Court, 
Congress intended to broaden presidential emergency powers when it 
passed IEEPA.84 As previously discussed, the statute’s legislative 
history muddies this conclusion.85 Nevertheless, structural challenges 
in IEEPA cases typically fail due to judicial deference.86 
In particular, the political question doctrine has allowed judges to 
avoid hearing these cases. Theoretically, the political question doctrine 
preserves the separation of powers by excluding policy-driven 
controversies from judicial review.87 The doctrine bars courts from 
hearing claims that the Constitution assigns to a different branch or 
that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”88 
National security cases raise quintessential political questions,89 and 
courts will not second guess the president’s decision to declare or 
continue a national emergency.90 However, some cases touching upon 
national security or foreign relations may not lie “beyond judicial 
cognizance.”91 
The political question pumpkin transforms into a justiciable 
carriage once the president wields emergency powers to the detriment 
of individual rights.92 As Part II discusses, courts have repeatedly 
 
 83. Id. at 678. 
 84. See id. at 678–79 (basing its divination of Congress’s intent on Congress’s practical 
constraints and “a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
President”). 
 85. See supra Part I.A. 
 86. See CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The U.S. Campaign To 
Freeze Assets of Proliferators and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 849, 861 (2009) (“U.S. 
courts typically decline to question the executive’s invocation of IEEPA . . . .”); Koh, supra note 
60, at 1305–17 (discussing judicial deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs, through 
both affirmative rulings on the merits and refusal to hear a challenges on justiciability grounds). 
 87. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (describing the political question doctrine as an outgrowth of the separation of powers). 
 88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 89. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy 
and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”). 
 90. See United States v. Spawr Optical Rsch., Inc., 685 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(characterizing declaration and continuation of national emergencies as “essentially political 
questions” (quoting United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 579 (C.C.P.A. 1975))); 
Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194–95 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding whether an 
emergency was properly declared is a political question), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 91. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
 92. See Chachko, supra note 67, at 1136 (“Once individuals are directly affected, the issues 
before courts transform from abstract policy problems . . . to narrowly tailored questions of 
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adjudicated procedural due process disputes arising from executive 
action pursuant to IEEPA or other transaction-blocking authorities. 
For instance, in the foreign investment context, the D.C. Circuit has 
explicitly held a due process challenge to a presidential divestment 
order does not pose a political question.93 The court explained that a 
due process claim neither challenges the president’s determination as 
to what constitutes a national threat nor attacks the president’s 
selected response.94 Instead, a due process challenge fits squarely 
within the judicial role: interpreting the Constitution.95 The judiciary 
may intercede when the political branches threaten individual 
constitutional rights, such as the procedural due process rights to 
meaningful notice and the opportunity to respond.96 But, for pure 
structural threats, the judiciary has been reluctant to restrain 
presidential emergency powers. 
In sum, separation of powers jurisprudence does little to rein in 
the emergency executive. As interpreted, IEEPA broadly empowers 
the president, so challenges to presidential authority will continue to 
fail as Congress and the courts pass the buck back and forth. Cast under 
IEEPA’s long shadow, presidential transaction bans are unlikely ultra 
vires, but the president still cannot wield emergency powers to subvert 
constitutional rights. External limits, such as procedural due process, 
provide more meaningful constraints on executive power and sound 
bases for judicial review. 
 
administrative law and procedural due process—the type of questions that courts decide 
regularly.”); Alexander F. Cohen & Joseph Ravitch, Comment, Economic Sanctions, Domestic 
Deprivations, and the Just Compensation Clause: Enforcing the Fifth Amendment in the Foreign 
Affairs Context, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 146, 148 (1988) (“To succeed against economic sanctions in 
federal court, a litigant must rely on the Bill of Rights, demonstrating that some aspect of the 
program violates a right guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
 93. See Ralls, 758 F.3d at 314 (“We think it clear, then, that Ralls’s due process claim does 
not encroach on the prerogative of the political branches, does not require the exercise of non-
judicial discretion and is susceptible to judicially manageable standards.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) (clarifying courts may assess whether 
procedures “meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause,” even 
regarding issues “largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature”). Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has held the political question doctrine does not bar a takings claim ensuing from 
an economic sanctions program. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986). 
 96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976) (confirming that due process 
requires the government to offer notice and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). 
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II.  DICTATES OF DUE PROCESS 
At its core, due process entails two essential components: notice 
and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”97 To respond meaningfully, the aggrieved party 
must have access to the factual and legal bases for the government’s 
action.98 But limits exist. When acting pursuant to IEEPA, the 
executive branch need not provide procedures equivalent to a full-
blown judicial trial.99 The Ninth Circuit has clarified: “[T]he 
Constitution certainly does not require that the government take 
actions that would endanger national security . . . . But the 
Constitution does require that the government take reasonable 
measures to enforce basic fairness . . . .”100 Reasonableness is 
situational.101  
In Mathews v. Eldridge,102 the Supreme Court laid out a flexible 
balancing test to determine the process due in a given context.103 Courts 
must consider: (1) the private interest affected by government action; 
(2) the risk of “erroneous deprivation” of this interest through the 
procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the 
extent to which additional process would burden the government.104 
The weight attributed to these factors depends on context. 
As for timing, due process generally requires the government to 
provide “notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before 
 
 97. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552).  
 98. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 318 (“Both the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the 
right to know the factual basis for the action and the opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting 
that action are essential components of due process.” (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 
496 (1959))). 
 99. For instance, the D.C. Circuit determined that a designated charity had no due process 
right to cross-examine witnesses. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 
164 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 100. Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 101. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))). Due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950). 
 102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 334–35.  
 104. Id. 
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depriving a person of certain property interests.”105 In “extraordinary” 
situations, however, postdeprivation process suffices.106 Under the 
Supreme Court’s test in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,107 
to demonstrate an “extraordinary” situation, the government must 
show: (1) “an important governmental interest” required the 
deprivation; (2) there was “a special need for very prompt action”; and 
(3) a government official initiated the deprivation acting “under the 
standards of a narrowly drawn statute.”108 As with the extent of due 
process, timing depends on the situation’s particular circumstances. 
Because courts have developed a situational due process 
jurisprudence, the extent and timing of the process due depend on the 
nature of the threat and the executive response. As such, due process 
requires distinct procedures for entities that fund terrorism and 
businesses that gather U.S. consumers’ data even though both 
frameworks predominantly rest on IEEPA. Courts have largely 
developed due process requirements in the former context, but they 
have not yet determined what process is due when the president 
employs IEEPA to blacklist entities posing information-based national 
security threats. Instead, the due process rights of such technology 
companies may mimic those protecting foreign investors subject to 
presidential divestment orders, which arise under different legal 
authority but raise similar policy choices. Accordingly, this Part looks 
to the existing cases under IEEPA’s terrorist designation scheme and 
those involving foreign investment, analogizing these cases to the data 
security context. 
In assessing the scope of procedural due process in these varying 
contexts, this Part analyzes two interlinking questions: First, what 
processes are required by the Fifth Amendment? Second, must the 
government make these processes available to the private target before 
or after the property deprivation? As to the former question, the 
 
 105. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993)), 
aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 106. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–80 (1974). 
 107. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
 108. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. at 76 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678). In full, the third 
requirement mandates “the party initiating the deprivation was a government official responsible 
for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and 
justified in the particular instance.” Id. This language focuses on the decisionmaker rather than 
the substantive decision. After all, courts hesitate to second guess the policy merits of executive 
officials’ national security decisions. See supra Part I.C. 
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government must at least provide an adequate statement of reasons for 
its action based on the unclassified record, and it must offer the 
targeted entity an opportunity to respond. As to the latter, technology 
companies blacklisted for data security reasons are entitled to 
predeprivation process. 
A. Counterterrorist Financing 
The U.S. counterterrorist financing regime relies largely on 
IEEPA.109 On September 23, 2001, less than two weeks after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared a 
national emergency with respect to global terrorism, invoking IEEPA, 
and authorized the Treasury Department to block “all property and 
interests in property” of entities or individuals designated as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”).110 The emergency remains 
in effect,111 and, by one estimate, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (“OFAC”) had designated 6,763 such persons as of 
November 2018.112 As discussed in this Section, some designated 
groups and individuals have challenged their designations, providing 
rich case law on the extent and timing of procedural due process rights 
when the executive branch wields IEEPA. 
1. “What”: Extent of Process.  When the executive branch relies on 
IEEPA to blacklist terrorist organizations, due process requires the 
government to provide at least the unclassified factual basis for its 
action. Courts have sought to balance procedural rights and national 
security concerns. In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. 
Department of Treasury,113 the scales tipped in favor of procedural 
rights.114 
 
 109. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1094. 
 110. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 787 (2002); Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and 
Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 650–51 
(2008). 
 111. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 49. 
 112. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1095. 
 113. Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 114. See id. at 988 (“We hold that OFAC violated [Al Haramain’s] due process rights by 
failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons for its investigation.”); see also KindHearts 
for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864–67, 904–06 (N.D. 
Ohio 2009) (holding OFAC failed to provide adequate notice to a nonprofit after OFAC 
neglected to provide a copy of the administrative record to the nonprofit’s attorney). 
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In Al Haramain, a Ninth Circuit panel concluded procedural due 
process requires OFAC to state adequately the reasons for its 
determinations.115 OFAC provisionally blocked Al Haramain’s assets 
in February 2004 without explanation.116 When OFAC designated the 
foundation as an SDGT seven months later, OFAC publicly 
acknowledged only one of its three reasons for designating Al 
Haramain.117 Beginning in early 2005, the foundation requested 
administrative reconsideration, denying any connection to terrorism, 
and “repeatedly sought both an explanation for the designation and a 
final determination of its request for administrative 
reconsideration.”118 By August 2007, the organization had still received 
no response from OFAC, so it sued.119 
Applying Mathews, the panel held OFAC failed to provide 
adequate notice.120 Under the first factor—the private interest affected 
by government action—the foundation’s interest was substantial 
because OFAC prevented the foundation from using “any funds 
whatsoever, for any purpose,” effectively shuttering its business.121 In 
other words, “designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on 
certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic 
organization financially defunct.”122 The second factor—risk of 
erroneous deprivation—also proved significant because the foundation 
could only guess at OFAC’s reasons for acting.123 The third Mathews 
factor—the government’s interest and burden of providing additional 
procedural safeguards—also favored the foundation because OFAC 
 
 115. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 988. 
 116. Id. at 973, 985. 
 117. Id. at 973–74, 986. In September 2004, OFAC issued a press release stating that it had 
designated the foundation. Id. at 973–74. The court rejected OFAC’s argument that this press 
release amounted to sufficient notice. Id. at 986. According to the court, “the press release states 
with some clarity that [the foundation] supported Chechen terrorists,” but it did not apprise the 
foundation of OFAC’s concern regarding two individuals’ control of the foundation. Id. The court 
concluded, “OFAC provided notice concerning only one of three reasons for its investigation and 
designation, and that notice occurred seven months after it froze [the foundation’s] assets. Such a 
significantly untimely and incomplete notice does not meet the requirements of due process.” Id. 
 118. Id. at 974. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 986 (“Such a significantly untimely and incomplete notice does not meet the 
requirements of due process.”). 
 121. Id. at 985–86. 
 122. Id. at 980. 
 123. Id. at 986–87 (“[T]he opportunity to guess at the factual and legal bases for a government 
action does not substitute for actual notice of the government’s intentions.”). 
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failed to explain to the court why its scant process promoted national 
security.124 
Al Haramain also addressed the question of secret evidence—that 
is, evidence not disclosed to the blacklisted entity.125 The Due Process 
Clause typically does not require the government to divulge classified 
information.126 The government possesses a legitimate interest in 
safeguarding sensitive information, especially when disclosure might 
compromise national security, such as by unveiling intelligence sources 
or methods.127 As the Seventh Circuit stated, “The Constitution would 
indeed be a suicide pact if the only way to curtail enemies’ access to 
assets were to reveal information that might cost lives.”128 
Nevertheless, the government must reasonably try to mitigate secret 
evidence’s unfairness when the potential value to the designated entity 
outweighs the burden of mitigation.129 Failure to disclose information, 
 
 124. Id. at 986. 
 125. For a discussion of “secret evidence” and the shortcomings of approaches towards 
mitigating its unfairness to parties kept in the dark, see generally David Cole & Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Navigating the Shoals of Secrecy: A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Secret Evidence 
and ‘Cleared Counsel’ in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, in REASONING 
RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 161 (Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden 
& Nigel Bowles eds., 2014). 
 126. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(noting due process demands disclosure of “only the unclassified portions of the administrative 
record” (quoting People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003))); Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting there is “no automatic 
right to access classified evidence”). 
 127. Nice-Petersen, supra note 36, at 1410. 
 128. Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
 129. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 982–84. Mitigation procedures must “address the tension 
between fundamental fairness and secrecy.” Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at 162. Courts have 
balanced these concerns through various approaches. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has suggested 
that, in certain limited circumstances, the government must provide unclassified summaries of 
classified evidence. See Fares v. Smith, 901 F.3d 315, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (countenancing the use 
of unclassified summaries when it would not compromise intelligence sources or national 
security). Sometimes, however, the government cannot safely declassify or summarize sensitive 
information otherwise required to provide constitutionally adequate notice. 
Alternatively, another approach permits lawyers, but not their affected clients, to see the 
classified evidence. Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at 162. Under this approach, the lawyer must 
first obtain a security clearance and is prohibited from revealing the classified evidence to their 
client. Id. This elaborate strategy was embraced by a federal district judge in KindHearts for 
Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Geithner. 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 
2010) (proposing a multistep remedial procedure to determine the extent to which secret evidence 
could and should be declassified, summarized, or presented to counsel with security clearance). 
While creative, the security-cleared-counsel approach will not suffice. Sharing the classified 
information with a lawyer with a security clearance does not level the playing field because the 
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classified or otherwise, raises the risk of erroneous and unjust 
deprivation because it undermines the adversarial process.130 So the use 
of secret evidence remains highly suspect under the Mathews balancing 
test.131 According to the Ninth Circuit, “Only the most extraordinary 
circumstances could support [such] one-sided process.”132 But such 
extraordinary circumstances often permeate the national security 
space, so the government need not make the information available if it 
demonstrates why declassification, or some other mitigation strategy, 
would threaten national security.133 
Altogether, in the counterterrorist financing context, the 
government must at a minimum provide the unclassified record, but it 
must also reasonably try to mitigate any reliance on classified evidence. 
2. “When”: Timing of Process.  As the Ninth Circuit observed in 
Al Haramain, many courts have permitted postdeprivation process 
when the executive branch wields IEEPA to block terrorist 
financing.134 In counterterrorist financing cases, the government must 
 
lawyer cannot discuss the information with their client. See Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at 
163–66 (explaining the limits imposed on cleared counsel in communicating with their 
Guantanamo Bay detainees). Instead of fighting blind, the lawyer must now fight one-handed. 
 130. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he very foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information will 
violate due process because of the risk of error.”); Nice-Petersen, supra note 36, at 1407 (“When 
a blocked entity has been told little or nothing about the kind of evidence the government has 
accumulated against it, or what this evidence is specifically alleging, mounting a defense is akin to 
shooting in the dark.”). 
 131. Applying Mathews, a Ninth Circuit panel declared the “use of undisclosed information 
in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional” and upheld a permanent injunction 
barring the use of undisclosed classified information in an alien legalization proceeding. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1070–71. The panel further provided,  
We cannot in good conscience find that the President’s broad generalization regarding 
a distant foreign policy concern and a related national security threat suffices to support 
a process that is inherently unfair because of the enormous risk of error and the 
substantial personal interests involved. “[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, 
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.” 
Id. at 1070 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). At least in the immigration context, 
courts may scrutinize the government’s reasons for keeping others in the dark. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 982–83 (recognizing disclosure will not be possible when it 
would implicate national security). 
 134. See id. at 985 (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163–
64 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (allowing the executive branch to forego predeprivation process when 
wielding IEEPA to block terrorist financing); see also Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 
748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it 
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act swiftly and decisively to prevent the organization from spiriting 
assets beyond the reach of U.S. authorities.135 The Seventh Circuit has 
clarified that “[a]lthough pre-seizure hearing is the constitutional 
norm, postponement is acceptable in emergencies.”136 The Calero-
Toledo test helps identify such “extraordinary situations.”137 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia applied this 
test in Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development v. Ashcroft.138 
There, OFAC designated a foundation as a terrorist organization and 
blocked its assets without providing notice or a hearing beforehand.139 
The court determined the first Calero-Toledo requirement—“an 
important governmental interest”—was satisfied by the government’s 
interest in curtailing terrorist financing.140 As the court observed, 
OFAC designated the foundation less than three months after the 
September 11, 2001, attacks and President Bush’s ensuing executive 
order, which declared a national emergency to combat terrorist 
financing.141 The second requirement—“a special need for very prompt 
action”—also had been satisfied: “Money is fungible, and any delay or 
pre-blocking notice would afford a designated entity the opportunity 
to transfer, spend, or conceal its assets, thereby making the IEEPA 
sanctions program virtually meaningless.”142 The final Calero-Toledo 
requirement—whether the deprivation had been carried out by an 
 
“would allow any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. 
Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding the designated entity was 
“not entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Islamic 
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 135. See Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 985 (“[T]he potential for ‘asset flight’ almost certainly 
justifies OFAC’s decision not to provide notice before freezing the assets.”); Glob. Relief, 315 
F.3d at 754 (determining a preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it “would allow 
any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. 
Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]rompt action by the Government was 
necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.”), aff’d, 333 F.3d 
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 136. Glob. Relief, 315 F.3d at 754. 
 137. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–80 (1974). 
 138. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77. 
 139. Id. at 62, 76. 
 140. Id. at 76; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“[N]o governmental interest is 
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”). 
 141. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77. 
 142. Id. 
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authorized government entity—gave the court no pause.143 OFAC, 
acting pursuant to IEEPA and corresponding executive orders, carried 
out the designation and asset freeze.144 Concluding Calero-Toledo’s 
three requirements had been satisfied, the district court held OFAC 
had not defaulted on due process.145 Without revisiting the Calero-
Toledo analysis, the D.C. Circuit agreed.146 
In sum, when OFAC deploys IEEPA to freeze terrorist assets, 
postdeprivation process satisfies the Due Process Clause. This process 
requires notice including, at a minimum, the unclassified basis for the 
government’s action. The terrorist designation cases inform due 
process in other IEEPA contexts, such as data security, yet designated 
terrorists differ from data-gathering companies. National security 
review of foreign investment—admittedly governed by a different legal 
framework—operates in a more similar fashion to data security 
matters. 
B. Foreign Investment 
CFIUS is an executive branch committee that “monitor[s] the 
impact of foreign investment in the United States.”147 In general, 
CFIUS reviews transactions that might implicate national security, 
and, if concerns remain unmitigated, CFIUS may submit a negative 
determination to the president, who may then choose to block the 
transaction.148 Recent CFIUS trends reveal growing concerns about 
foreign, especially Chinese, control of U.S. technology and data.149 
Apprehensive about foreign investment in U.S. technology companies, 
Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 
Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”).150 FIRRMA expressly expanded CFIUS’s 
purview to transactions that may compromise “sensitive personal data 
 
 143. See id. at 77 (“[G]overnment officials, and not private parties, initiated the blocking 
action. OFAC did so pursuant to the IEEPA and two Executive Orders that specifically authorize 
such action in limited circumstances.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163–64 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 147. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990, 991 (1975).  
 148. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 22–23.  
 149. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“During the 115th Congress, many Members expressed concerns over 
China’s growing investment in the United States, particularly in the technology sector.”). 
 150. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 
Stat. 2174 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565); see JACKSON, supra note 6, at 11 (discussing the 
enactment of FIRRMA). 
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of United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner that 
threatens national security.”151 As of February 2020, only five 
transactions had been blocked by presidents through the CFIUS 
framework.152 Four involved Chinese companies or nationals.153 The 
president’s substantive determination is not subject to judicial review, 
but courts can and have reviewed these presidential bans to ensure due 
process.154 
IEEPA and CFIUS intertwine, but they are not identical. On one 
hand, CFIUS divestment orders resemble IEEPA transaction bans 
designed to secure data. Each of the frameworks involves economic 
powers wielded by the executive to deprive private parties of 
property.155 CFIUS review may culminate in a presidential order 
nullifying investments, much like an IEEPA order may prohibit 
transactions.156 On the other hand, IEEPA-based sanctions flow from 
“[p]residentially declared national emergenc[ies],”157 while CFIUS 
jurisdiction does not depend on declared emergencies.158  
Though salient, this distinction has lost force as checks on the 
president’s emergency powers have eroded.159 The ease with which 
 
 151. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III). 
 152. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 23. 
 153. See id. summary (describing presidentially blocked transactions following CFIUS 
review).  
 154. Id. at 23–24. 
 155. See generally Allman, supra note 7 (comparing and contrasting presidential action under 
CFIUS and IEEPA and arguing CFIUS provides the more appropriate framework for monitoring 
foreign investment in the United States). 
 156. The TikTok controversy illustrates the overlap between IEEPA and CFIUS. On August 
6, 2020, President Trump issued an executive order invoking IEEPA to ban all transactions with 
TikTok and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. Robert Chesney, Will TikTok Win Its 
Lawsuit Against Trump?, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2020, 9:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/will-
tiktok-win-its-lawsuit-against-trump [https://perma.cc/P3ZX-FSE3]. On August 14, 2020, 
President Trump ordered ByteDance to divest TikTok from its business. Id. This second order 
followed on the heels of a CFIUS review, initiated in June 2020, of ByteDance’s prior acquisition 
of the company that it rebranded as TikTok. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 14–17, 22. 
 157. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002), 
aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Some courts have distinguished the process due under IEEPA 
from other asset-freezing statutes on the basis that IEEPA-based sanctions require a 
presidentially declared national emergency. E.g., id.; Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified 
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 49 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Islamic Am. 
Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 158. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 8 (observing that Congress shaped CFIUS, in part, to 
enable the president to conduct “foreign investment policy” without needing to declare first a 
national emergency). 
 159. See supra Part I. 
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presidents now declare national emergencies dilutes the meaning of 
these so-called emergencies.160 Suppose entities indeed possess weaker 
due process rights when the president acts pursuant to IEEPA rather 
than a CFIUS review. The president could evade the stronger 
protections of the latter by declaring a pro forma emergency. 
Constitutional rights ought not turn on such formalist sleights of hand. 
Instead, the existing jurisprudence considers context, which invariably 
varies across emergencies. Accordingly, like the terrorist designation 
cases, CFIUS cases provide helpful data points by which to interpolate 
the scope of the process due when the president invokes IEEPA in the 
name of data security. 
1. “What”: Extent of Process.  In the foreign investment setting, as 
in the counterterrorist financing context, due process at least requires 
access to the unclassified evidence. In Ralls Corp. v. Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States,161 the D.C. Circuit evaluated 
whether the president violated the Due Process Clause by ordering 
Ralls, a U.S. company owned by Chinese nationals, to divest from a 
windfarm project located in Oregon.162 Specifically, Ralls had 
purchased four U.S. companies to develop windfarms near a Navy 
installation, raising national security concerns.163 After the deal had 
been completed, CFIUS reviewed the transaction and concluded that 
it threatened national security.164 CFIUS referred the matter to the 
president, who agreed and ordered Ralls to divest.165 Both CFIUS and 
the president failed to give Ralls notice and an opportunity to rebut the 
evidence on which they had based their determinations.166 Ralls sued, 
challenging the presidential order on due process grounds.167 
The D.C. Circuit pointed to Mathews as the seminal case for 
determining the “specific dictates of due process.”168 However, instead 
of applying the Mathews factors one by one, the court referred to its 
 
 160. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text for a discussion of presidents’ broadening 
IEEPA usage and the concomitant explosion of national emergency declarations. 
 161. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 162. Id. at 301–02. 
 163. Id. at 304–05. 
 164. Id. at 301. 
 165. Id. at 301–02. 
 166. Id. at 306.  
 167. Id. at 302.  
 168. Id. at 317 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975)). 
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precedent in non-IEEPA terrorist designation cases.169 The court 
noted, as in the terrorist designation cases, “a substantial interest in 
national security supports withholding only the classified information 
but does not excuse the failure to provide notice of, and access to, the 
unclassified information used to prohibit the transaction.”170 According 
to the court, the presidential order deprived Ralls of due process by 
failing to provide any of these procedural touchstones.171 In dicta, the 
D.C. Circuit suggested adequate process during CFIUS review could 
theoretically also satisfy the president’s due process obligations; 
however, the chance “to submit written arguments, meet with CFIUS 
officials in person, answer follow-up questions and receive advance 
notice of the [government’s] intended action” will not suffice.172 
Rather, the sanctioned party must receive “the opportunity to tailor its 
submission to the [government’s] concerns or rebut the factual 
premises underlying the President’s action.”173 Therefore, the 
government must give its reasons, at least the unclassified ones. 
2. “When”: Timing of Process.  Despite tolerating postdeprivation 
process alone in terrorism cases,174 courts have also required 
predeprivation process in the foreign investment context. In addition 
to exploring the basic contours of due process, the Ralls case addresses 
when such process comes due. The court stated that the company 
“must receive the procedural protections [the court has] spelled out 
before the Presidential Order prohibits the transaction.”175 The court 
 
 169. See id. at 320 (“Under our [foreign terrorist organization] precedent, this lack of process 
constitutes a clear constitutional violation, notwithstanding the [government’s] substantial 
interest in national security and despite our uncertainty that more process would have led to a 
different presidential decision.” (first citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 613 F.3d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); and then citing Nat’l Council of Resistance 
of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). The terrorist designation 
scheme referenced arises under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), which does not require a national emergency 
declaration. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). For a discussion of AEDPA and associated due process 
concerns, see generally Justin S. Daniel, Comment, Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations: 
Classified Information, National Security, and Due Process, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (2017). 
 170. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 208–09). 
 171. Id. at 319–20. 
 172. Id. at 319. 
 173. Id. at 320 (first citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); and then citing Nat’l 
Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 205). 
 174. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 175. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320 (emphasis added). 
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held for Ralls because neither CFIUS nor the president had provided 
adequate predeprivation process.176 The opinion does not mention 
Calero-Toledo but instead relies on the D.C. Circuit’s non-IEEPA 
terrorist designation cases.177 These other terrorism cases establish that 
the government may not forego predeprivation process unless the 
government demonstrates such timing would jeopardize national 
security.178 So too with foreign investment.179 As the discussion in Part 
II.A.2 illustrates, the government has repeatedly established such a 
pressing need when it wields IEEPA to freeze terrorists’ assets, thereby 
enabling the government to delay process in that setting. But, at least 
in Ralls, the government failed to justify postponed process in the 
foreign investment context.180 
C. Data Security 
When the president invokes IEEPA to ostracize foreign 
technology companies, due process is owed to a similar extent but 
likely comes due at an earlier time. The distinctive natures of the 
national security threat and government response influence the process 
due—both its extent and timing—under the Mathews and Calero-
Toledo tests. This Section applies these tests to data security, 
comparing and contrasting data security to counterterrorist financing 
and foreign investment. This Section argues that data security likely 
parallels foreign investment more closely than it does counterterrorist 
financing. As in the counterterrorism and foreign investment contexts, 
the government must at least provide its reasons for blacklisting the 
targeted entity based on the unclassified record, and it must offer the 
targeted entity an opportunity to respond. However, unlike designated 
terrorist organizations, technology companies blacklisted for data 
security reasons, like foreign investors, are entitled to predeprivation 
process. 
 
 176. Id. at 321; see supra Part II.B.1. 
 177. See Ralls, 758 F.3d at 318–20 (discussing precedents involving terrorist designations 
under AEDPA and finding them “precisely on point”). 
 178. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding due process must be 
provided “prior to the deprivation worked”); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 613 F.3d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have held due process requires that the [putative 
foreign terrorist organization] be notified of the unclassified material on which the Secretary [of 
State] proposes to rely and an opportunity to respond to that material before its 
redesignation . . . .”). 
 179. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320. 
 180. Id. at 321. 
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1. “What”: Extent of Process.  On a categorical level, companies 
that allegedly pose informational threats to U.S. national security merit 
due process protections that are co-extensive with those arising in the 
contexts of counterterrorist financing and foreign investment. As 
applied to data security, the Mathews test suggests that the government 
must at least provide technology companies with its reasons for acting 
based on the unclassified record. 
The first Mathews factor—the affected private interest—cuts in 
favor of significant due process. A presidential transaction ban 
strangles the targeted corporation’s domestic business, much like an 
OFAC asset freeze starves a designated entity. Expulsion from U.S. 
markets could spell ruin for many technology companies. As Al 
Haramain demonstrates, this existential private interest merits robust 
procedural safeguards.181 Additionally, an IEEPA-authorized 
transaction ban parallels a divestment order following CFIUS 
review.182 As in Ralls, the targeted company is entitled to due process 
to protect its “substantial property interests.”183 
As to the second factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—
errors grow more likely when the government makes the blacklisted 
party guess at governmental concerns. Secret evidence further 
obfuscates the government’s rationale and blinds the targeted 
company. The company can neither alleviate the government’s 
concerns when it does not know why the government has acted nor 
correct factual errors without access to the government’s record. 
Asymmetric information undermines the adversarial process assumed 
by the Due Process Clause.184 Future courts will need to delineate how 
much information makes notice adequate. Still, Al Haramain and Ralls 
indicate that the government must provide more than a general 
statement; rather, adequate notice requires specific reasons and 
evidence.185 Hinting at data security will not fit the bill, and the 
government will need to delineate why the targeted company’s data 
collection and retention methods threaten national security. To 
minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation, the government must at 
 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 182. See supra Part II.B. 
 183. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 321. 
 184. See supra notes 125–133 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
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least share its reasons, unless doing so would undermine national 
security. 
The third Mathews factor—the governmental interest and burden 
of providing additional procedural safeguards—will depend on the 
government’s ability and willingness to articulate why more robust 
procedures would jeopardize national security. Securing U.S. user data 
supplies a compelling governmental interest, and courts defer to the 
political branches on such matters of national security policy.186 
Nevertheless, Al Haramain and Ralls confirm that the government 
cannot merely wave national security as a talisman and ward off due 
process challenges.187 The government must make its case, which will 
vary with context. Sometimes national security will require procedural 
shortcuts, but only when the government has explained why such 
shortcuts are necessary to safeguard U.S. blood, treasure, and data. 
In the context of data security, the government must explain why 
providing a blacklisted technology company with additional 
information would expose sensitive U.S. user data or otherwise harm 
national security interests. However, without access to the 
government’s classified information, it is unclear whether the 
government’s ability to justify cutting procedural corners categorically 
differs between counterterrorist financing, foreign investment, and 
data security. Despite their differences, the former two categories have 
fallen under the same fundamental rule: the government must provide 
financial actors with at least its reasons for acting based on the 
unclassified record. Technology companies are entitled to this same 
foundational process. However, due process diverges as to the timing 
of these protections depending on the category at hand. 
2. “When”: Timing of Process.  When the president invokes 
IEEPA to respond to a putative data security threat, the targeted entity 
should receive predeprivation process. Under existing law, the 
government must justify its failure to provide predeprivation notice.188 
According to the Supreme Court, “It is by now well established 
that . . . ‘[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
 
 186. See supra Part I.C. 
 187. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 188. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974) (permitting 
postponement of process only when the government has shown “extraordinary” circumstances 
exist). 
ELLISON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2021  10:05 AM 
528  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:499 
protections as the particular situation demands.’”189 The distinct threat 
of aggregated data and the nature of a prospective transaction ban 
probably do not justify departing from the predeprivation default. 
Applying Calero-Toledo’s test, the Due Process Clause more 
likely requires predeprivation process for companies that collect data 
as opposed to entities that fund terror, which receive only 
postdeprivation process. Like combatting terrorism, data security 
almost certainly qualifies as an “important governmental interest,” 
satisfying the first Calero-Toledo requirement.190 After all, even the 
Supreme Court acknowledges that “no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation.”191 The third Calero-Toledo 
requirement also poses no obstacle to postdeprivation process. The 
president plainly qualifies as a “government official” acting under 
statutory authority.192 But, the second requirement complicates the 
analysis. 
Under Calero-Toledo, the government may provide 
postdeprivation process only if it has demonstrated “a special need for 
very prompt action.”193 Courts have recognized such a need when 
OFAC freezes assets of designated terrorists pursuant to IEEPA to 
prevent asset flight.194 Any preblocking process would enable the 
designated entity to hide, spend, or scramble the money, thereby 
evading sanctions.195 However, this special need evaporates when the 
 
 189. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972)). 
 190. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 191. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); see also Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77 
(describing “combating terrorism by cutting off its funding” as an “important government 
interest”). 
 192. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 985 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he potential for ‘asset flight’ almost certainly justifies OFAC’s decision not to 
provide notice before freezing the assets.”); Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (determining a preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it “would allow 
any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified 
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding a designated entity was “not entitled 
to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Islamic Am. Relief 
Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77 
(“[P]rompt action by the Government was necessary to protect against the transfer of assets 
subject to the blocking order.”). 
 195. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 194. 
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president prospectively excommunicates a technology company to 
protect personally identifiable information. Rather than tying down 
assets in the United States, the government prohibits transactions with 
a problematic company to expel it from the U.S. market. Asset flight is 
not the fear but the policy. The government action would prove all the 
more effective if predeprivation notice were to drive the data collecting 
company more quickly away from vulnerable U.S. users. Thus, under 
the Calero-Toledo test, the Due Process Clause demands 
predeprivation notice when the executive subjects a technology 
company to a transaction ban citing data security concerns. 
The argument for predeprivation process suffers one primary 
flaw—the IEEPA transaction ban only issues following a declared 
national emergency. Perhaps these labeled exigencies provide an 
“extraordinary circumstance” that excuses belated process, but the 
government may not simply cry “national emergency” and skirt 
constitutional rights. Not all emergencies are created equal.196 Due 
process depends on the nature of the threat and the government 
response.197 On its face, an executive order may rely on IEEPA when 
prohibiting transactions with a company to control the flow of user 
data. However, this presidential action de facto resembles a 
presidential ban following CFIUS review. 
Take Ralls for example. Upon CFIUS’s recommendation, 
President Obama ordered a U.S. company owned by Chinese nationals 
to divest from a windfarm project, citing espionage concerns.198 The 
D.C. Circuit held the presidential order violated the Due Process 
Clause because the government had not provided Ralls with notice or 
the opportunity to respond beforehand.199 
In comparison, President Trump’s TikTok August 6 order 
prospectively blocked transactions with a U.S. company owned by a 
Chinese company, indicating data security concerns.200 The executive 
order covered “any transaction by any person, or with respect to any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” with 
 
 196. See, e.g., Selden, supra note 9, at 528 (arguing courts should balance “the degree of the 
national emergency against the types of constitutional freedoms abridged”). 
 197. See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
 198. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 301–02, 304 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 199. Id. at 321. 
 200. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020); TikTok Complaint, supra 
note 17, at 2–3, 6. 
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TikTok.201 Citing IEEPA as the source of presidential authority, the 
executive order articulated the threat: 
TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its 
users, including internet and other network activity information such 
as location data and browsing and search histories. This data 
collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to 
Americans’ personal and proprietary information—potentially 
allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and 
contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and 
conduct corporate espionage.202 
With both Ralls and TikTok, the intended effect was the same: to 
banish a U.S. company with Chinese ties to protect sensitive 
information. Perhaps these concerns justify the presidents’ bans. 
Perhaps not. Regardless, the functional equivalence of the bans 
suggests that the Due Process Clause requires prior notice and the 
opportunity to respond in both situations, even when IEEPA is 
nominally invoked as an alternative to the CFIUS process.203  
Taken together, the existing cases under IEEPA and other deal-
cancelling frameworks suggest that the president must offer due 
process before outlawing transactions with companies that allegedly 
threaten data security. Postdeprivation process is permissible to enable 
OFAC to wage war on terrorists’ wallets.204 Predeprivation process is 
required when ordering foreign companies to divest from U.S. ventures 
due to espionage concerns.205 In the counterterrorism context, the 
government wishes to secure the money to keep terrorists away from 
U.S. individuals. In the divestment order context, the government 
wishes to keep foreign money away to secure U.S. information. Data 
security more closely resembles this second setting, so it likely calls for 
similar procedural safeguards—predeprivation process in particular. 
As such, the Due Process Clause significantly protects entities targeted 
under IEEPA for informational threats. It buys them time and chances 
to state their cases. However, procedural rights do not assure 
substantive victory. 
 
 201. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. at 48,637–38. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Allman, supra note 7, at 312 (arguing Ralls provides a “compelling due process 
argument” against an IEEPA ban having the same effect). 
 204. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 205. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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III.  LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS 
The bundle of due process rights forms a humble raft, by which 
some technology companies might hope to remain afloat, but the vessel 
leaks from both ends. At the threshold, some foreign companies lack 
due process rights altogether. At the back end, remedies remain 
restricted. This Part addresses both limitations in turn. 
A. Front-end Limitations: Availability of Due Process 
Procedural due process rights protect many, but not all, 
technology companies subject to executive emergency powers. 
Corporations and individuals alike are entitled to due process when the 
government deprives them of life, liberty, or property.206 However, due 
process rights do not extend to all; rather, foreign entities must 
establish “substantial connections” with the United States to secure 
due process protections.207 Some due process challenges to IEEPA-
authorized actions have faltered at this threshold.208 
In applying the “substantial connections” test, the D.C. Circuit 
seemingly requires some degree of physical presence in the United 
States.209 For instance, in one case, the D.C. Circuit held two Iranian 
 
 206. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 24 S. Ct. 436, 444 (1904) (“Corporations are persons 
within the meaning of the constitutional provision forbidding the deprivation of property without 
due process of law . . . .”). 
 207. The Court has stated that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–66, 271 (1990) (suggesting Fourth 
Amendment rights inure to the benefit of only those with “substantial connections” with the 
United States). The “substantial connections” test has also been applied to the Fifth Amendment. 
See Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182–83 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting, to receive 
Fifth Amendment protections, aliens must have “substantial connections” to the United States 
(quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271)). 
 208. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2004) 
(determining an entity lacked due process rights because it had “no substantial connection to the 
United States”); Fulmen Co. v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 1:18-cv-02949, 2020 WL 
1536341, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no 
property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial connections’ 
necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”). 
 209. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“A foreign entity without property or presence in the United States has no constitutional 
rights, under the Due Process Clause or otherwise.”); see also FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 209 F. 
Supp. 3d 299, 327–28 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting the substantial connections test “suggests at least 
some degree of physical presence”); Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. 1:19-cv-02554, 2020 WL 1911561, at 
*5 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2020) (concluding the plaintiff could not bring a Fifth Amendment challenge 
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organizations were entitled to due process because they had alleged 
substantial connections in the form of a U.S. office space and bank 
account.210 Yet, in another instance, a post office box and U.S. bank 
account did not suffice.211 The difference—the physical office—
suggests possessing property in the United States brings an entity 
within the ambit of the Due Process Clause.212 
Many companies that gather personally identifiable information 
hold property within the United States, thereby exhibiting the 
necessary connections to avail themselves of due process. Many 
technology companies have based their U.S. operations out of U.S. 
offices.213 Consider TikTok. TikTok’s principal place of business is in 
California.214 Many of TikTok’s key personnel, including its interim 
CEO and General Counsel, work from the United States.215 In fact, 
TikTok, incorporated in the United States, is not even a foreign 
entity.216 Because TikTok has literally rooted itself in the United States, 
it may avail itself of U.S. constitutional rights. More broadly, as 
technology companies set up shop in the United States, they come 
closer to U.S. consumers, data, and constitutional rights. 
However, other data-gathering technology companies may not 
exert such a robust U.S. presence particularly because the digital 
economy transcends geographic boundaries. Many data-producing 
 
where the plaintiff failed to allege physical presence), dismissing appeal No. 20-5121, 2020 WL 
4107145 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2020). 
 210. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–02 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 211. 32 Cnty. Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 212. See Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Taken together, then, these 
cases at least imply that a foreign national with property in the United States has a sufficient 
connection to the United States to raise at least some constitutional claims.”). 
 213. The United States is home to “far more [large tech companies] than any other country.” 
Jonathan Ponciano, The World’s Largest Technology Companies in 2021: Apple’s Lead Widens as 
Coinbase, DoorDash Storm into Ranks, FORBES (May 13, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2021/05/13/worlds-largest-tech-companies-2021/ [https:/
/perma.cc/E8XT-P7HM]; see also François Candelon, Martin Reeves & Daniel Wu, 18 of the Top 
20 Tech Companies Are in the Western U.S. and Eastern China. Can Anywhere Else Catch Up?, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/05/18-of-the-top-20-tech-companies-are-in-
the-western-u-s-and-eastern-china-can-anywhere-else-catch-up [https://perma.cc/634H-Q67H] 
(“Today’s digital world is organized around two centers of gravity: the U.S. West Coast and the 
east coast of China. . . . The leading companies in online search, social media, and e-commerce 
are all based in one or the other of these two regions.”). 
 214. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 6. 
 215. Id. at 14. 
 216. Id. at 6, 8. 
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transactions transpire on the internet rather than U.S. soil. As the 
digital economy develops, operations may completely untether from 
the physical market that businesses, and particularly technology 
companies, wish to reach.217 In fact, many technology companies are 
“born global,” meaning they can connect “with international 
customers, suppliers, capital, and mentors from day one.”218 As a result, 
many foreign entities serving U.S. consumers do not maintain any 
physical presence in the United States. While integrating the global 
economy, this unbundling could increase the number of companies 
serving U.S. consumers without carrying on such a U.S. presence so as 
to entitle these companies to due process rights. 
As the information age advances, the law may reimagine 
“substantial connections” to transcend physical presence. If virtual 
presence were to suffice, many companies would pass through the 
“substantial connections” filter, especially those that pose 
informational threats to national security. After all, these technology 
companies gather data by virtually interacting with U.S. users. Some 
companies, like TikTok, bolster their virtual presence with a physical 
presence by storing U.S. user data on servers in the United States.219 
Such behavior strengthens a company’s ties to the United States and 
claim to due process rights. Whether the law will come to redefine 
“substantial connections” in the digital age remains an open question. 
Regardless, under existing law and economic trends, many data-
gathering entities pass the “substantial connections” test. Assuming 
they do, and assuming they prevail on the merits, these entities still may 
win only restricted relief. 
 
 217. McKinsey & Company has observed, “[Companies] that deliver digital goods and 
services can enter new international markets without establishing a physical presence at all.” 
JAMES MANYIKA, SUSAN LUND, JACQUES BUGHIN, JONATHAN WOETZEL, KALIN STAMENOV 
& DHRUV DHINGRA, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION: THE NEW ERA OF 
GLOBAL FLOWS 15 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/
McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Digital%20globalization%20The%20new%20era%20of%
20global%20flows/MGI-Digital-globalization-Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/U6J5-AB5Z]. 
 218. Id. at 46. 
 219. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
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B. Back-end Limitations: Procedural Remedies 
Procedural rights offer only procedural remedies. National 
security’s high stakes counsel judicial restraint.220 In both 
counterterrorist financing and foreign investment cases, courts hesitate 
to vacate executive branch decisions to avoid speculating as to how 
affording due process might affect the determination; instead, courts 
remand with procedural instructions.221 Furthermore, classified 
evidence limits procedural redress because many blacklisted entities 
will never see the classified information used against them.222 Data 
security cases share these limits just as presidential tech-targeting 
transaction bans share common statutory and functional settings with 
OFAC asset freezes and post-CFIUS divestment orders, respectively. 
So, even when presidents invoke data security—rather than 
terrorism—as the basis for their orders, and even when presidents 
strive to cause—rather than avoid—asset flight, courts choose from a 
limited menu of remedies in deference to the executive’s national 
security policy judgments. 
Nevertheless, even these limited procedural remedies carry 
significant value to technology companies sitting on troves of U.S. data 
because timing is everything. Like companies subject to post-CFIUS 
divestment orders, technology companies subject to IEEPA-
authorized executive orders are entitled to due process before the 
deprivation has occurred, that is before the company is expelled from 
U.S. markets.223 So, not only does the Due Process Clause give such 
companies a chance to contest the government’s decision, but the 
clause also gives them the gift of time: time to argue and time to stall—
perhaps even long enough to endure until a new administration with 
different enforcement priorities takes control. TikTok, for instance, 
illustrates the ticking clock. President Trump issued the executive 
 
 220. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding without vacating because of “the realities of the foreign policy and 
national security concerns”). 
 221. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 
658 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[T]he proper remedy for a notice violation in the context of designation 
proceedings is to remand to OFAC, without vacatur . . . , with instructions as to what additional 
notice is required.”); Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 320–21 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (preserving a presidential order to divest despite its violating company’s procedural 
due process rights). 
 222. See supra notes 125–133 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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order to prospectively excommunicate TikTok on August 6, 2020.224 
TikTok fought the ban in court.225 By February 2021, the Biden 
administration paused the litigation and permitted TikTok to operate 
unscathed as the new president pondered his predecessor’s policy, 
thereby allowing TikTok to evade a fire sale to Oracle and Walmart.226 
At the end of the day, the company may not change the government’s 
mind even when given the process due. But due process makes that day 
much longer. 
In sum, the Due Process Clause significantly protects many data-
gathering technology companies that fall prey to the president’s 
emergency economic powers. Due process does so notwithstanding the 
front-end limits on procedural rights’ availability to foreign entities and 
the back-end limits on procedural remedies. The predeprivation 
process available to such companies promises time, making due 
process particularly valuable in the data security setting. 
But due process is no panacea. It safeguards constitutional rights 
but not constitutional structure. Specifically, the Due Process Clause 
alone will not control the president’s vast emergency powers and 
preserve the balance of power within the federal government because 
“only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its 
fingers.”227 
IV.  AMENDING IEEPA 
Congress should amend IEEPA to restore the balance of power 
between the branches of the federal government. Any amendment 
must reckon with the unpredictability of future emergencies and the 
practical reasons motivating Congress to delegate emergency powers 
to the president in the first place.228 Acknowledging this uncertainty, 
many commentators have clamored for a sunset provision, under which 
 
 224. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020). 
 225. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 226. John D. McKinnon & Alex Leary, TikTok Sale to Oracle, Walmart Is Shelved as Biden 
Reviews Security, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2021, 5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-to-
oracle-walmart-is-shelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401 [https://perma.cc/38WA-XR9K]. 
 227. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 228. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the extent and 
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may 
be necessary to satisfy them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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presidentially declared emergencies would automatically terminate 
unless extended by Congress.229 This Note endorses this reform. 
Congress should amend IEEPA so that presidentially declared 
emergencies sunset unless Congress extends them through a fast-track 
review process. This Part begins by revisiting the need for IEEPA 
reform and details the suggested amendment. Next, it considers 
potential objections and concludes that IEEPA reform would dovetail 
with due process and sustain constitutional structure. 
As discussed in Part I.A, IEEPA provides little supervision as it is 
currently used. IEEPA confers broad emergency powers on the 
president, including the power to declare when such powers are 
activated.230 The president may easily renew declared emergencies by 
notifying Congress and publishing renewals in the Federal Register.231 
Originally, NEA and IEEPA relied on a legislative veto to check 
presidential power, providing that Congress could terminate a declared 
emergency by concurrent resolution.232 In striking down legislative 
vetoes, the Supreme Court eliminated this safeguard, so now Congress 
must amass a veto-proof supermajority to terminate a national 
emergency over presidential opposition.233 Even if Congress were to 
work this miracle, the president could still unilaterally proclaim a new 
emergency.234 Today, Congress cannot second guess presidents’ 
emergency declarations, permitting presidents to make their own laws, 
 
 229. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1047, 1060–61 (proposing amendment so that 
emergencies would terminate after two or three months, requiring renewal by escalating 
congressional supermajorities); Carter, supra note 55, at 1259–60 (advocating a sunset provision 
to “stimulate a greater discussion of the issues and [to] require Congress to take a position”); Koh, 
supra note 60, at 1321 n.314 (suggesting emergency orders automatically expire unless extended 
by Congress through fast-track approval mechanisms); Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: 
The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 
1211–12 (2000) (suggesting a sunset provision); Peter Harrell, The Right Way To Reform the U.S. 
President’s International Emergency Powers, JUST SEC. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/69388/the-right-way-to-reform-the-u-s-presidents-international-emergency-powers 
[https://perma.cc/58UE-DTE4] (advocating for amending IEEPA to require congressional 
approval to extend emergencies beyond six months or a year). 
 230. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)–(b) (allowing the president to trigger emergency powers by 
declaring a national emergency). 
 231. See id. § 1622(d) (requiring the president to renew declared national emergencies each 
year by publishing a renewal in the Federal Register and transmitting notice to Congress). 
 232. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 46. 
 233. Id. For a deeper discussion of legislative vetoes and IEEPA, see supra notes 49–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 234. Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1080–81. 
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at least during nominal emergencies. Congress has de facto abdicated 
its power to check presidents when they wield IEEPA. 
To reclaim its supervisory role, Congress should amend NEA and 
IEEPA to include a sunset provision, as suggested by numerous 
commentators.235 With a sunset provision, a national emergency would 
automatically terminate after a specified period unless Congress were 
to vote affirmatively to extend the emergency. Under the amended 
framework, a presidential emergency declaration would trigger a fast-
track process for Congress to extend the declared emergency.236 Unlike 
IEEPA’s existing reporting requirements, this amendment would force 
Congress to consider the policy merits of declared emergencies, 
holding both Congress and the president politically accountable. 
This amendment might stoke fears that congressional gridlock will 
doom some so-called “national emergencies.” Legislators might seek 
to leverage emergency renewal votes to achieve unrelated political 
ends. This amendment might replace executive initiative with 
congressional stalemate. However, numerous factors assuage these 
concerns. First, fast-track provisions would expedite the legislative 
process and minimize procedural saber-rattling. For instance, such 
procedures could prohibit certain amendments or motions and include 
privileged access to the Senate and House floors.237 Congress has 
already employed similar fast-track provisions to review the use of 
military force under the War Powers Act.238 Second, the president 
would remain free to respond to a crisis before the emergency sunsets, 
perhaps after a few months. Instead of cabining the president,239 this 
amendment would help keep emergencies “rare and brief” as 
envisioned by IEEPA’s drafters, comporting with the intuition that 
true emergencies are immediate crises rather than extended 
 
 235. See sources cited supra note 229. 
 236. For instance, Professor Harold Koh has similarly suggested that IEEPA reform could 
deploy a fast-track process “to ensure express congressional approval or disapproval of the 
President’s emergency actions before the emergency expired.” Koh, supra note 60, at 1321 n.314. 
 237. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20234, EXPEDITED OR “FAST-
TRACK” LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES 1 (2015). 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Luong, supra note 229, at 1212 (“[A sunset provision] would not compromise the 
president’s functional superiority in responding to external threats while still adhering to 
Congress’s primary legislative authority, including its express power to regulate foreign 
commerce.”). 
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conflicts.240 Congressional approval, not executive fiat, better indicates 
whether a national emergency ought to extend beyond the immediate 
crisis. Third, the president may continue to utilize other tools, such as 
the CFIUS framework, to block transactions that threaten U.S. 
security. Whatever risk of legislative gamesmanship remains 
unmitigated is but a small price to pay for the protection of U.S. 
institutions and rights. 
The proposed structural safeguards would harmonize with the 
existing due process jurisprudence. Procedural due process rights 
protect private interests, but congressional oversight supplements 
these safeguards by more generally protecting individual rights from 
executive overreach.241 But not all statutory reforms equally accord 
with due process. Unlike a procedural checklist mandated by statute, 
the ex post congressional oversight proposed in this Part better accords 
with the flexible due process jurisprudence. Under existing law, the 
rigor of due process depends on the situation, giving legal effect to a 
gut sense that different emergencies beget different responses. 
Congress should not dress this practical instinct in a procedural 
straitjacket, which would command procedures too robust in some 
circumstances and too weak in others given IEEPA’s wide-ranging 
uses. Furthermore, statutory safeguards would almost certainly not 
solve the prickly problem of secret evidence. Instead of freezing due 
process by statutorily defining it, Congress should restore political 
process. 
A sunset provision paired with fast-track approval would help 
Congress claw back its role in checking executive power. Like the Due 
Process Clause, these political checks would protect individuals and 
enterprises, but they would also limit potential executive abuse of 
emergency powers. In doing so, this approach would neither prevent 
the president from responding to immediate threats nor reduce due 
process to a rigid checklist. From combatting terrorism to protecting 
sensitive user data, the United States must respond to a broad array of 
threats. Accordingly, the statute should allow for short-term executive 
discretion subject to meaningful review by both courts and Congress. 
 
 240. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10 (1977) (“[E]mergencies are by their nature rare and brief, 
and are not equated with normal, ongoing problems. . . . A state of national emergency should 
not be a normal state of affairs.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Burton, J., 
concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique 
for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law 
be made by parliamentary deliberations.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Procedural due process shields many technology companies 
targeted for their troves of U.S. user data. The precise contours of this 
shield have yet to be measured in judicial opinions and scholarship. 
This Note extrapolates due process’s dimensions from the examples of 
counterterrorist financing and foreign investment. When the president 
uses IEEPA to expel data-collecting companies from the U.S. 
economy, the government must provide meaningful notice and an 
opportunity to respond before a presidential transaction ban takes 
effect. This notice must at least include the government’s unclassified 
reasons for acting. However, due process cannot cure all. Companies 
without substantial ties to the United States lack due process rights 
altogether, and procedural rights beget only procedural remedies. 
Even so, predeprivation process affords many private actors the gift of 
time, safeguarding constitutional rights. 
As for constitutional structure, due process alone will not buoy the 
interbranch balance of power in the face of unchecked emergency 
executive power. Congress should add a sunset provision to IEEPA, as 
many scholars have suggested. Congressional oversight of emergency 
declarations would supplement individual procedural rights with a 
structural check on executive overreach. 
By ensuring due process and reviewing emergency declarations, 
the courts and Congress must engage to manage otherwise unfettered 
presidential power. From counterterrorist financing and foreign 
investment to data security, due process and political process must 
work in tandem to protect both constitutional rights and structures. 
Only then should we trust the process. 
 
